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Abstract
Rawls’ theory of distributive justice may serve as a useful model in conceptual-
izing a model of the ideal political economy – one that seeks to keep inequalities 
that have come about as a result of natural accident to a minimum. Moreover, his 
principles of justice can be used correctively, to address institutional inequalities 
that have the effect of entrenching social dislocation. Kenya has, over the decades 
up until now, been riven by injustices relating to land. This has led to the develop-
ment of a small cluster of landed elites while the majority of citizens are effectively 
denied land access rights. This is regardless of the fact that most of the land so 
acquired by the former was acquired irregularly and with disregard of bona fide 
title of the original occupants. The concept and process of transitional justice may 
be viewed as the vehicle toward attaining corrective justice and accountability for 
offences committed in times of national crisis as a restorative measure. 
I. Introduction
Kenya, being a constitutional democracy,1 is necessarily apt for an analysis 
of  its political economy against the minimum standards imposed by the Consti-
tution. The letter of  the Constitution (and of  the laws that have been legislated 
under it) is clear. The question this contribution addresses itself  to is whether its 
* The author is a student at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya.
1 It is noteworthy that Rawls models his theory against the political constitution of  a constitutional 
democracy. Arguably, this makes this theoretical referent more relevant in the case of  Kenya. Rawls 
regards the task of  his political philosophy as combining intuitive ideas drawn upon in ‘justice as 
fairness’ into a political conception of  justice for a Constitutional democracy.
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spirit has been honoured by the institutions and power structures that have been 
constituted under it. Of  particular concern for this article is the land sector, and 
therefore the extent to which the legal requirements, especially the rights guaran-
teed under land legislation, have been met. 
This contribution will argue that they have not, at least not satisfactorily, 
and certainly not to the extent that the Constitution envisions. A corollary of  
this observation is the argument that the power structures that may have lingered 
from the previous regimes in Kenya have remained oblivious to entrenched in-
justices respecting land rights. It will be argued that this fact has helped exacer-
bate the inequities that have persistently and historically characterized the land 
sector, and, by extension, the cultural and economic lives of  most of  the citizens.
This contribution will, as a precursor to the discussion above, attempt to 
conceptualise Kenyan society in light of  the ideas of  distributive justice, the most 
prominent and seemingly plausible one being that by Rawls, ‘justice as fairness.’ 
This hypothetical will be viewed in the light of  Kenya’s historical and contempo-
rary situation. The Kenyan land question will be viewed from the perspective of  
this conception of  justice as a negative reference frame; that is, it will be shown 
that the Kenyan situation falls short of  the requirements of  this hypothetical 
‘justice’, and that at the moment the two exist in a manner antithetical to each 
other. This will be done by considering the key expositions of  John Rawls and 
contrasting them to the situation in Kenya. This will reveal that if  justice as 
fairness were the universal bar of  evaluating a political economy’s faithfulness 
to guaranteed Constitutional rights, then, in the land sector, Kenya falls awfully 
short. This discussion will also involve an elaboration of  the historical injustices 
that have actually taken place, their effects on the sections of  the population that 
have been the victims, and the place of  this discussion in light of  Constitutional 
rights.
The final part will involve a discussion on how best Kenya can reach this 
hypothetical (but plausible and arguably incontestable) point of  a ‘fair’ justice. It 
will be argued that, in view of  previous failed attempts at correcting these prob-
lems, the best and surest path lies in the process of  transitional justice. This is 
because corrective and restorative justice, from the perspective of  this argument, 
must, in order to address the entrenched injustices to their essence, involve cor-
rective and restorative justice. This process involves accountability on the part of  
the perpetrators of  human rights violations. An important part of  this process is 
to eliminate the false impression of  redress of  past injustices that the laws may 
seem to now represent, and instead confront the problem itself—inequitable 
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landholding patterns sustained by increased impunity entrenched in the political 
economy and concealed by the veil of  responsive and altruistic legislation. The 
move is as pragmatic as it is idealistic.
II. The Rawlsian Hypothetical and Kenya’s Land Question Compared 
John Rawls’ theory of  justice has been among the most prominent contri-
butions by any thinker in the field of  political economy. His theory of  distribu-
tive justice (A Theory of  Justice) is based on the idea that society is a system of  
cooperation for mutual advantage between individuals. As such, it is marked by 
both conflicts of  differing opinions and an identity of  shared opinions.2 Accord-
ing to Rawls, principles of  justice should define the appropriate distribution and 
burdens of  social co-operation.3
It should be stressed that Rawls did not expect of  his theory of  justice to 
have uniform, unqualified application. Indeed, he notes that there are various 
conditions that affect a workable conception of  justice, and that, ideally, such a 
conception must allow for a diversity of  doctrines defined by members of  exist-
ing democratic states.4 It is for this reason that the argument developed here with 
relation to ‘justice as fairness’ is predicated on the particular circumstances of  
Kenya that render the former applicable to that context.
The academic argument made here is that the distribution of  such burdens 
and advantages in Kenya’s land sector falls short of  the ideal conceptualized by 
Rawls. This is a fact that would be established without further historical inquiry 
with regard to the political antecedents of  the landholding patterns in Kenya. 
However, such further inquiry will reveal, as has been extensively argued and 
documented, even in Government policy statements,5 that the present state of  
affairs in the land sector has been a result of  deliberate political action involv-
ing land misappropriation, grabbing as well as illegal and irregular allocations. 
These actions, spanning the decades of  the last century, have led to a system of  
entrenched inequities in landholding. At this point the argument ceases to be 
2 Lacewing M, ‘Rawls and Nozick on Justice’, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, www.alevelphi-
losophy.co.ke on 31 August 2015.
3 Rawls J, A Theory of  Justice, Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1999, 4.
4 Rawls J, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not metaphysical’ 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs Journal, 3 (1985), 
223-251.
5 See for instance the National Land Policy, Sessional Paper No. 3 of  2009. 
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academic; the assessment is based on facts, and Kenya’s history is rife with these 
facts. 
Having established that the present system is not desirable – at least from 
the perspective of  Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’, and that the conditions that have 
precipitated the present system are decidedly unjust, the argument explored is 
that of  corrective justice geared to a certain kind of  distributive justice. This 
should be a legal process and not a political endeavour. This contribution identi-
fies transitional justice as the most viable route toward this end, for reasons that 
will be elaborated.
Rawls’ project is one of  using social contract theory to generate principles 
of  justice for assigning basic rights and duties and determining the division of  
social benefits in a society. He uses a hypothetical starting point analogous to 
that of  traditional social contract theory. This is a hypothetical because it is not 
presented as a historical fact, but as an abstract reference frame for building what 
would come to be viewed as the principles of  justice in society.6
The distinctive characteristic of  this original position is the ‘veil of  igno-
rance’, which is a figurative representation of  the fact that individuals in this posi-
tion are aware neither of  their status in society nor their personal or psychologi-
cal propensities. The reason why this ‘veil’ is important in leading up to a certain 
conception of  justice is that the principles generated are:
“the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of  equality as defining the fundamental terms of  
their association.7 These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify 
all kinds of  social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of  government 
that can be established.” This way of  regarding principles of  justice Rawls calls ‘Justice 
as Fairness.’8
Since all are similarly situated the decisions regulating subsequent interac-
tions are based on common agreement, and no one is able to skew such princi-
ples in favour of  his particular conditions. The principles so settled upon are to 
regulate the criticism of  all subsequent institutions. 
The two principles that would be reached in an original position of  fairness 
and equality are (i) each person to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty for others and (ii) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
6 Rawls J, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, 223-251.
7 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 10.
8 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 33.
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that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage; and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all.9
The project of  justice as fairness is that of  using social contract theory 
to generate principles of  justice for assigning basic rights and duties and deter-
mining the division of  social benefits in a society. Upon a consideration of  the 
general principles predicating the Kenyan legal framework that are of  special 
relevance to equality and justice, the position that best commends itself  to us is 
that it seeks to effectuate, inadvertently or otherwise, some of  the main tenets of  
justice as fairness. Only in this case there is no veil of  ignorance but a normative 
framework that is justice-oriented, a kind of  justice as fairness, nonetheless. As 
will be seen, the same cannot be said of  the political realities themselves; these 
are what is in need of  reform if  the justice sought is in fact going to be fair. This 
will become more apparent after the discussion on historical injustices with re-
gard to land, the effects of  which persist.
Rawls attaches (an) unimpeachable value to justice as fairness as a guiding 
principle as well as an end.
‘Justice is the first virtue of  social institutions. Laws and institutions no matter how 
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed and abolished if  they are unjust. Each 
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of  society as 
a whole cannot override.’10
The importance of  Rawls’ theory to the issue at hand lies not so much in its 
extensive detail as in its recognition of  the inviolability of  the individual, which 
cannot be overridden by such other meta-narratives as efficiency or overall social 
welfare. Indeed, it has been observed that the Kenyan referent does differ with 
some areas that are actually important in A Theory of  Justice, such as the idea of  
the veil of  ignorance.
The assertion that the individual is inviolable and his interests paramount 
has strong implications for the concept of  distributive justice. This is so because, 
arguably, one important objection that could be raised against distributive justice 
or redistribution in particular, is that such a drastic change would spell catastro-
phe for systemic efficiency sustained over time. It is noteworthy that this objec-
tion is not raised against distributive justice as a principle (that there should be 
a good measure of  equality for burdens and benefits distributed by institutions 
among the members of  society), but on its consequences in the market itself. In 
9 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 289.
10 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 26
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fact, this line of  thought has informed decisions regarding land allocation and 
re-allocation as a matter of  policy in post-independence Kenya. The lesson to be 
learnt is that this policy created, in the long run, deeper inequalities whose cost to 
the Kenyan society far outweighs the potential benefits envisioned by policymak-
ers aiming to sustain the status quo at that point in time. The regnant approach 
in Kenya’s political sphere has historically been, essentially, the prioritisation of  
economic and other interests when it comes to land allocation,11 at the expense 
of  satisfying legitimate entitlements to land. Such an approach is clearly antitheti-
cal to the idea of  distributive justice in ‘Justice as Fairness’. The argument this 
paper makes is that as a departure to this regnant approach, justice as fairness 
would demand that every individual be granted (not just guaranteed) their basic 
liberties under the political Constitution, and this should not be subordinated to 
economic or other interests. In any event, a departure from this ideal would only 
be allowable, according to the second principle of  justice in justice as fairness, 
if  the (permitted) inequalities are to the greatest benefit of  the least-advantaged.
Having established that in justice as fairness the basic liberties of  citizens 
are taken as settled, and that justice as a virtue is uncompromising, we must es-
tablish whether these academic (or even transcendental) propositions are actually 
regarded as sound in the Kenyan legal framework. If  our sources in this respect 
lead us to answer in the affirmative, then, based on available evidence we must 
not hesitate to conclude that Kenya’s landholding patterns are unjust and that, 
therefore, are incongruent with the (rational) decisions already articulated by the 
Kenyan populace regarding the principles to which they intend to subject their 
affairs.
A problem of  a rational decision has a definite answer only if  we know the 
beliefs and interests of  the parties, their relationships in respect with one another 
and their alternatives when they have to choose. The simple questions that predi-
cate this discussion would therefore be approximated as the following: Do the 
provisions of  law correctly represent the positions that would be taken by the 
members of  Kenyan society as rational beings? If  this question is answered in 
the affirmative, can the same be said of  the landholding patterns, or are they de-
cidedly unequal or unjust, particularly in light of  historical circumstances? Does 
the Rawlsian view of  justice, therefore, as a corrective measure, represent a rea-
11 See for instance, Karuti K, ‘The legacy of  the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-
2007 election violence in Kenya’ Journal of  Contemporary African Studies; on the various post-indepen-
dent settlement schemes, and of  the attempts by the Independence Government to assuage certain 
militants who felt the that the land issues were being ignored or shelved. 
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sonably sensible ideal? By virtue of  the social dislocation caused by land-related 
conflicts, as well as the inequalities created by misappropriation and irregular 
allocation as a backdrop against which the new Constitutional dispensation is 
viewed, is Kenya consequently a society in transition? Finally, is transitional jus-
tice, with all factors considered, a viable avenue toward realising the Rawlsian 
ideal? The following sections try to delineate these considerations along the lines 
of  argument outlined before.
III. Justice as an Uncompromising Principle in Kenya’s Legal 
Framework
The spirit that fuelled the clamour for a new Constitution for Kenya and 
the repealing of  all laws repugnant to justice (such as Section 2(a) of  the In-
dependence Constitution) in the last two decades is captured well in the body 
of  legal opinion surrounding the Constitution development process. Jackton 
Ojwang12 contrasted the dynamics of  Constitution making at independence with 
those that characterized the Constitution-reform debate in the last decade. This 
juxtaposition yields the conceptual issues that ought to have been addressed at 
independence but were not, and the need to address them in contemporary times 
through a new Constitutional law. Indeed, the Constitution adopted was largely 
modelled along the dynamics of  the Westminster system.
Professor Ojwang’s argument can be condensed into three main points. 
That the Independence Constitution was formulated under the following pecu-
liar factors:
(i) The levels of  literacy and education were relatively low. This meant 
that the possibility of  a united people, politically aware and knowl-
edgeable of  its rights, which it pursued through a political apparatus, 
was not really realized. In such a situation, the dominant values of  a 
society or political constituency would not be subject to agreement by 
consensus.
(ii) The profile of  the process was that it was effectively in the hands of  
a small political elite who were in a position of  goodwill and trust 
which subsisted even after independence. These were susceptible to 
12 Ojwang JB, ‘Constitutional reform in Kenya: Basic conceptual issues and concepts’, in Report of  the 
Constitution of  Kenya Review Commission, 5 (2003)14.
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co-option by the departing European powers as well as tightly circum-
scribed interests which did not necessarily represent the best for the 
nation as a whole. This was a political reality that led to an ‘ascendant 
Executive’, evidenced by the subsequent amendments to the Constitu-
tions that were primarily political and strategic.
(iii) The net effect of  this profile was that the Constitutional order put in 
place was not truly informed by the social and economic needs of  the 
people.
If  these factors can be considered as exempting the Independence Gov-
ernment from blame, moral or otherwise, for failing to be responsive to the im-
peratives of  the social consciousness at the time, the same cannot obtain today. 
Dialogue leading up to the adoption of  the New Constitution has been character-
ized by an emphasis on public participation and responsive laws. Section 4 of  the 
Constitution of  Kenya Review Act13 required the development of  a new Consti-
tutional document to be conducted in the context of  popular participation.
Jackton Ojwang, in outlining the broad reform issues to be addressed by the 
Constitution, noted that the ‘primary interest of  the Kenyan people in securing 
a reformed Constitution will rest upon certain broad social welfare issues.’14 In 
any country, he states, citizens expect governance systems to secure values such 
as equity, justice, peace and tranquillity. The realization of  these attributes is a 
function of  power allocation and management.15
Even more significant for the purposes of  settling basic rights and articu-
lating justice as an uncompromising principle is the Constitution of  Kenya. The 
Preamble to the document articulating its spirit reads, in part: ‘recognizing the 
aspirations of  all Kenyans for a government based on the essential value of  hu-
man rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of  law.’
Article 10(2)(b) includes among the various national values and principles 
of  governance human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human 
rights, non-discrimination and protection of  the marginalized.
Article 27(1) provides that everyone is equal before the law; Article 28 fur-
ther provides that everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity 
respected. 
13 Cap. 3A, Constitution of  Kenya Review Act.
14 Ojwang JB, ‘Constitutional reform in Kenya: Basic conceptual issues and concepts’, 13.
15 Ojwang JB, ‘Constitutional reform in Kenya: Basic conceptual issues and concepts’, 15.
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Equitable access to land is of  particular importance to this discussion. Article 
60(1)(a) instructs that equitable access to land is to be a principle of  land policy in 
Kenya. Accordingly, Sections 72 to 75 of  the National Land Policy16 acknowledge 
that by virtue of  land being a finite resource, there is need to restrict the rights 
of  ownership to facilitate sustainable resource utilization. The Government is 
entrusted with the duty to facilitate sustainable resource utilization. Section 4 of  
the Land Act17 further provides that this and other guiding principles relating to 
land bind all State organs, State officers and public officers as well as any other 
person who makes or implements such policy. 
The foregoing observations doubtless answer our earlier question with re-
gard to the place of  basic individual liberties and uncompromising justice in the 
Kenyan legal framework. The question (posed earlier) must be answered in the 
affirmative. The crux of  the matter, however, lies not in the law; it lies with the 
fact. The following sections will seek to establish that neither in contemporary 
nor past Kenyan society, starting from the colonial era, has this ideal been fully 
realized, let alone the Rawlsian ideal, which is considerably higher and arguably 
more sophisticated.
Of  key importance to the import of  the observations above is to under-
stand, historically, the regnant policies in respect to land as well as the relation-
ship between access to land and other fundamental values or rights. This will 
enable us to bring Rawls’ expositions regarding basic rights and entitlements into 
perspective, in the particular context of  Kenya. The highlights of  government 
policy to be discussed below will reveal that fairness has hardly been a priority in 
land allocation by (primarily the first two) previous governments. 
This contribution will propose that equality and social justice in Kenyan so-
ciety must cease to be a formal equality and instead become a moral and political 
principle. Once it is established that the landholding system in Kenya is predomi-
nantly inequitable and that fair access to land remains a high-sounding illusion 
(but an illusion, nonetheless), a pragmatic approach must be taken toward the 
actualization of  Constitutional imperatives for actual reform. Once our long-held 
belief  in the determinacy of  our legal rules is confronted with the stark realities 
that prove such determinacy to be a myth, we must begin revising our convic-
tions about the surest mechanisms for eradicating the issues that still subsist and 
whose resolution has been long overdue.
16 Republic of  Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 3 of  2009.
17 Land Act No. 6 of  2012.
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The following statistics make the issue clear:
(i) Research suggests that smallholder farms in Kenya have been shrinking 
over time. Roughly forty percent of  Kenya’s population resides on five 
percent of  its arable land, creating an apparent ‘land amidst scarcity 
abundance.’18 It has been suggested that this may be because arable 
land has remained underutilized as it is yet to receive sufficient public 
investment. The other argument, which is important for the purposes 
of  this paper, is that as in other countries with a colonial settler history, 
there has been the post-independence continuation of  colonial tenure 
systems separating ‘customary lands’ from ‘state lands.’19
(ii) Research also indicates that three percent of  the population owns 20 
percent of  the arable land.20
(iii) Much of  Kenya’s unutilized arable land is under state authority, which 
is not readily accessible for settlement by smallholder populations un-
der prevailing land allocation institutions.21
(iv) Lack of  access to land is a major determinant of  poverty in Kenya. 
Above eighty percent of  the population depends on agriculture and 
rising inequality in landholding exacerbates this.22
(v) Approximately two million people live in Nairobi’s informal settle-
ments and slums alone. They make up over half  the capital’s popula-
tion yet are crammed into only five per cent of  the city’s residential 
area and just one per cent of  landin the city.23
The landholding patterns in Kenya (which are sustained by the existing 
power structures) are decidedly inequitable, and therefore unjust. A further argu-
ment is made that the same are in violation of  Constitutional imperatives and 
18 Jayne TS and Muyanga M, ‘ Land constraints in Kenya’s densely populated rural areas: Implications 
for food policy and institutional reform’, Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 86th 
Annual Conference of  the Agricultural Economics Society, University of  Warwick, United King-
dom, 2012, 16-18.
19 The World Bank, ‘Rising global interest in farmland report’, Washington D.C, 2011
20 Jayne TS and Muyanga M, ‘Land Constraints in Kenya’s Densely Populated Rural Areas: Implica-
tions for Food Policy and Institutional Reform.’
21 Jayne TS and Muyanga M, ‘Land constraints in Kenya’s densely populated rural areas: Implications 
for food policy and institutional reform.’
22 Encyclopedia of  the Nations, Kenya- Agriculture, www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Kenya-
AGRICULTURE.html on 3 December 2013.
23 Pamoja Trust, An Inventory of  the slums in Nairobi (unpublished report), 2009, 10. Citing “Inventory 
of  Nairobi Slums”, Matrix Consultants, 1998.
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illegal; this effectively constitutes a denial of  the Constitutional right to fair ac-
cess to land. When understood within the context of  Ojwang’s expositions about 
Constitutional principles in contemporary times as ideally articulating social wel-
fare imperatives, it becomes clear that the realities of  landholding in Kenya stand 
in opposition to these imperatives. The upshot of  this is that the situation there-
fore stands in need of  reform.
Now it is risky to view such illegality as an absolute, stand-alone declara-
tion of  fact. It is important here to make two points. First, the concept that is 
envisioned by this contribution, and by the Constitution, is fair and equitable 
access rights and not equal ownership of  land as a resource. Second, inequitable 
distribution becomes unconstitutional (and illegal) in the tightly-circumscribed 
sense of  Article 40 of  the Constitution on the protection of  the right to prop-
erty. Sub-section (6) provides that such rights do not accrue to any property that 
has been acquired illegally. Irregularly acquired land therefore, ipso facto, consti-
tutes an illegality, regardless of  the distributive consequences or the implications 
for the imperative of  fair access. Whether redistribution of  irregularly acquired 
property is inherently incontestable as a principle is a question that needs much 
consideration. For the keen observer, this fact already raises a critical issue what 
are the implications of  the foregoing on the rights of  the bona-fide third party 
title-holders through succession, purchase or otherwise?
At this point we are returned to Rawls’ hypothetical. Unequal starting po-
sitions in the basic structure of  society serve to maintain (and are usually the 
product of) entrenched inequalities. Not only are these inequalities pervasive, but 
they affect men’s initial chances in life, yet they cannot possibly be justified by an 
appeal to the notions of  merit or desert.24 Yet according to Justice as Fairness, 
having prior regard to particular circumstances which produce diverse doctrines 
of  justice25, justice as fairness only tries to draw upon basic intuitive ideas that are 
embedded in the political institutions of  a Constitutional democratic regime.26 
Therefore, these principles should suffice to settle such concerns at a general 
level.
24 Rawls J, A Theory of  Justice, 30.
25 Rawls J, ‘Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical’, 225.
26 Rawls J, ‘Justice as fairness: Political not metaphysical’, 223-251.
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IV. Historical Injustices Exacerbating Inequities in Landholding
Several events in Kenya’s history have radically transformed the land alloca-
tion structure. The original point, which should be kept in mind, is customary 
land tenure, which seems to represent the highest ideals of  inclusiveness and fair 
(but not necessarily equal) rights of  access to land. They have, in one way or the 
other, constituted the abusive practices mentioned before.
The (ostensibly) legal acts of  the colonial government can be said to be 
predicated on supplanting communal tenure with the introduction of  private 
property in order to entrench the colonial capitalist system that would primarily 
benefit the settlers, who would own the factors of  production, including land. 
This is essentially land appropriation; it was irregular because it paid no regard to 
the equitable interest of  native occupants of  the land, even less their indefeasible 
title by reason of  long and continued possession.27
Independence for Kenya brought in its wake, as a corollary to self-
government, the promise that Africans would have their property rights 
restored. Indeed, land rights and poor conditions in the native reserves had 
been the main grievances that led to the Mau Mau Rebellion.28 Moreover, 
the fact that there had been threats of  regrouping by these fighters during 
the first years of  independence,29 when it seemed that the Nationalist 
Government was not intent on redressing these wrongs, demonstrates 
the centrality of  the land question even in post-independence Kenya. 
Particularly, this demonstrates that the clamour for corrective justice in land 
has been perpetual and protracted.
The gravity of  the land question (essentially, appropriation of  large tracts 
by the Colonial Government) was not helped by the measures adopted by the 
Independence Government. Settlers wanted to give (sell) their land but on their 
own terms, to secure their own interests. The administration at independence 
27 For the juridical measures adopted by the colonial government to lay sovereign claim over land, see 
Foreign Jurisdictions Act of  1890, The Crown Lands Ordinance of  1915, the Kenya Annexation 
Order in Council as well as the case of  Isaka Wainaina v Murito [1922-1923] 2 KLR 102 on the effect 
of  these legislations.
28 This was an uprising by African- mainly Kikuyu- peasantry in the 1950s against the colonial govern-
ment, the initial grievance being land restitution and later, self-rule.
29 See Anhinga K, ‘The Legacy of  the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 elec-
tion violence in Kenya, Journal of  Contemporary African Studies, on the various post-independent settle-
ment schemes, and of  the attempts by the Independence Government to assuage certain militants 
who felt that the land issues were being ignored or shelved.
Transitional Justice as a Path to Distributive Justice
37Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
agreed to re-Africanise the highlands but catered for economic stability rather 
than addressing landlessness.30
The government was therefore effectively engaged in a delicate balance 
between efficiency and equity, a balance which, incidentally, seemed to increas-
ingly tilt toward the former. Rawls would criticize the Independence Govern-
ment’s approach to ‘Re-Africanisation’ for prioritizing economic stability and 
neglecting the inherent inviolability of  each participant in the social contract 
notwithstanding the social cost. If  the reader may recall, it is a cardinal tenet of  
justice as fairness that individual liberties should not be subordinated to the sum 
of  calculable interests derived from other considerations. Indeed, each person 
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that the welfare of  society alone 
cannot override.31
As elaborated, the Independence Government, to the extent that it pro-
ceeded to allocate land oblivious of  the previous property regimes and rights, 
in favour of  political and economic considerations at the expense of  equitable 
land distribution- which had been the primary grievance in the colonial era- did 
so irregularly. The core tenets of  justice as fairness at this time appear to have 
receded into the background.
If  the myopic subordination of  the rights of  indigenous land-holders to 
political and economic considerations was the earlier stage in the systemic ne-
glect of  their plight, then endemic corruption and overt arrogation of  land by 
those in higher echelons of  power was the next. 
According to the Ndung’u Report32 on illegal and irregular allocation of  
land, most illegal allocations of  public land took place before or soon after the 
1992, 1997 and 2002 elections.
Land grabbing has been defined as the taking possession of  and/or con-
trolling a scale of  land for commercial/industrial or agricultural production 
which is disproportionate in size (in comparison) to the average landholding in 
the region.33 A critical evaluation of  this phenomenon reveals two aspects that 
characterise it. First, abusive practices in the process of  acquiring the land, and 
30 Kitching G, Class and economic change in Kenya: The making of  an African petite bourgeoisie, Yale University 
Press (1980).
31 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 3.
32 Ndung’u Report: Land and graft in Kenya.
33 FIAN International, Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique: A report on two research missions and a 
human rights analysis of  land grabbing (2010).
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second, the distributional aspects of  the phenomenon and its impact on the 
political economy and the local and national populations’ right to resources for 
both today and the future.
The abusive nature of  land-grabbing practices is further illustrated by the 
political goings-on in the second regime of  government in Kenya. This is what 
is captured by the observation in the report cited above. Land grabbing under 
this regime reached an unprecedented scale with the advent of  political liberalisa-
tion in Africa. It has been argued34 that ‘powerful actors will attempt to maintain 
patrimonial control by developing creative counter-strategies to change. When 
faced with declining patronage resources, they will find alternative sources, often 
amplifying corruption and violence in the process.’
Political liberalization meant that in Kenya, the 90s represented a context of  
increased political freedom and competition as major aid donors in 1991 coor-
dinated their actions to cut off  non-humanitarian balance of  payments pending 
political reforms.35 Reduction in aid resulted in concurrent reduction in tradi-
tional resources of  patronage for the government and in such a context, public 
land, being highly accessible and less encumbered by international conditions, 
became an attractive patronage asset.36
The second level of  the two-pronged analysis of  land grabbing and ir-
regular allocation is the distributional aspect. This refers to the impact of  these 
practices on the modern national economy, and equity and access to land as an 
integral part of  human rights and distributive justice. It is at this point, as men-
tioned in the beginning, that an abstract comparison is drawn between Rawlsian 
justice as an ideal and the contemporary situation in Kenya.
Forced evictions are an inevitable consequence (in fact, a distributional as-
pect) of  land grabbing if  such land is already occupied. Forced evictions them-
selves are sinister and notorious, and not as nuanced as the underhand dealings 
that lead up to the grabbing of  land. It is regrettable that those on the receiving 
end of  both of  these machinations are the (urban) poor; with limited resources at 
34 Klopp JM, Pilfering the public: The problem of  land grabbing in contemporary Kenya, Indiana University Press.
35 Frank H and Ford M, ‘ Kenya: Slouching toward Democracy’39 Africa Today, 3 (1992), 97–111.
36 For a detailed account of  prominent cases of  land grabs by this government see Kanyinga K ‘The 
legacy of  the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya’, 
Journal of  Contemporary African Studies. Particularly, two cases are of  note: Westlands Market where 
an open air market was annexed to foreign private developers and the case of  Karura Forest where 
the government was actively involved in spreading propaganda and false information to conceal the 
irregular allocation of  land. The former case involved disentitling a large community of  landholders 
that had benefited from a government program.
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their disposal to seek redress the fact that they may have equitable property rights 
or title by reason of  long possession notwithstanding.
It has been argued in previous studies that:
‘forced evictions are widespread in Kenyan cities and are, on the surface, caused by 
conflicts in land- rights, non-payment of  excessive land and house rents, and urban 
redevelopment. But, more fundamentally, evictions are due to factors embedded in the 
country’s political economy, in particular, the grossly inequitable land ownership struc-
ture which makes it difficult for the poor to access land and decent shelter.’37
The socioeconomic, cultural and political consequences of  evictions in-
clude individual and social impoverishment, loss of  livelihood and traditional 
lands as well as physical injury resulting from arbitrary violence.
According to a certain report,38 forced evictions violate, directly or indi-
rectly, the full spectrum of  civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights en-
shrined in international instruments. These violations can directly be attributed 
to the way evictions are carried out, the way they are planned, the way they are de-
cided, the use of  harassment, threats or force, and the results of  the evictions.39
It is important to devote time and effort (especially correctively) to under-
stand the misconceived notions that attempt to rationalise and demonstrate the 
necessity, as well as constituting the justification, of  forced evictions.
It is widely held, for instance, that slums are a drain on the economy and 
criminally-infested areas deserving of  destruction, rather than an integral part of  
the urban environment.40 This notion is, at its root, misleading. Slums and other 
informal settlements form the base of  the informal sector that is a major part 
of  the country’s economy.41 Specifically, sector contributes labour, employment, 
income, and markets as well as cheap goods and services that are indispensable 
to urban economic production and household survival in the country. Socially, 
due to their vastness and population, they make an important contribution to the 
nation’s social reproduction. Politically, the burgeoning populations in these in-
formal agglomerations form a politically large constituency especially when mo-
bilised, such as at the independence struggle.42 Similarly, evictions on the surface 
37 Otiso KM, ‘Forced evictions in Kenyan Cities’ 23 Singapore Journal of  Tropical Geography, 3 
(2002).
38 United Nations (UN) Common Country Assessment for Kenya, 1998.
39 United Nations (UN) Common Country Assessment for Kenya, 1998.
40 Otiso KM, ‘Forced evictions in Kenyan cities.’
41 Otiso KM, ‘Forced evictions in Kenyan cities.’
42 Otiso KM, ‘Forced evictions in Kenyan cities.’
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appear to be caused by the enforcement of  municipal planning, building by-laws, 
government orders, conflict over land rights, political struggles, non-payment of  
(unjust) land and house rents, state security and urban (re)development.43 Funda-
mentally, however, they are caused by factors embedded in the political economy. 
Most notable has been the country’s land-ownership structure that has precluded 
many poor people’s access to land and decent shelter. 
Underlying notions that characterise government policy should be ap-
praised in an equally critical manner to unearth biases and truths. Essentially, any 
corrective measures regarding land should be aimed, at a broad level, at address-
ing the attendant problems associated with these historical injustices. ‘Justice as 
Fairness’ is instructive in that the principles entered into (for instance, in this 
case, legal measures for accountability and redress) are the basis for appraising 
institutions and public offices tasked with reform.
V. Potential Trade-offs in Attaining the Rawlsian Ideal
It has been argued repeatedly that one of  the core tenets of  ‘Justice as 
Fairness’ is that the individual possesses an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of  a society alone cannot override.44 Perhaps it this principle 
that constitutes the rationale behind Sections 72 to 75 of  the National Land 
Policy (discussed earlier) as well as Article 60 of  the Constitution on equal access 
to land.
It is submitted here that a plausible argument for the protection of  slum 
dwellers from arbitrary eviction through legitimate property rights may be made 
in light of  Article 63(1) of  the Constitution that recognises ‘similar community 
of  interest’ of  a certain constituency as a basis to assert rights to community 
land. It would be of  great use to policy-makers to consider the arguments against 
‘formalising the informal’ property. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
there is no necessary causal link between individual land rights and economic 
growth.45 This point has special relevance when it comes to the potential trade-
offs that the Rawlsian ideal presumably implies. If  it is proved that there is little 
43 Apiyo LO, ‘Land grabbing and evictions in Kenya’ (1998). See here: http://www.africabib.org/rec.
php?RID=Q00034933 on 13 December 2015.
44 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 3.
45 See Ogendo HWO, Formalising the Informal, on the fallacies that characterize the conversion of  cus-
tomary land tenure to private land tenure through individual titling.
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to be lost by formalising and titling, which effectively means that land is owned 
by the title-holder to the exclusion of  all others including holders of  bona fide 
interests in land, pragmatic steps can be taken to ensure all basic entitlements are 
met. The (delicate) ‘balancing act’ between equity and efficiency is in this case 
not a factor.
The principles of  landholding, use and administration in Article 60 include 
‘equitable access to land, and ‘security of  land rights.’ Recognition of  informal 
settlements as community land for dwellers and then actively integrating these 
areas through urban planning would help serve both ends. This view is further 
informed by the realisation that slums are an important factor in the social, po-
litical and economic spheres of  the country and thus need to be integrated not 
arbitrarily wiped out. Moreover, after considering the history of  forced evictions 
it becomes clear that slums cannot really be removed by this means, no matter 
how frequent and widespread the evictions are. These failings should be enough 
to guide policymakers towards better, sustainable alternatives. Rawlsian justice 
articulates tenets that are useful for such a situation going forward. First, the 
inviolability of  the individual and their basic entitlements must be stressed. Sec-
ondly, principles of  justice entered into by the individuals in society by their free 
and rational choice are to regulate all further criticism of  society’s institutions. 
Thirdly, these principles must be the basis of  Constitution and the basic structure 
of  society- essentially institutions charged with distributing benefits (and enforc-
ing burdens) in the society. Uncompromising principles that have been settled by 
the various land legislations and the Constitution must be considered keenly by 
these institutions and implemented.
VI. The Way Forward
These passages have essentially made the point that some events in Kenya’s 
history have served to radically transform the property rights allocation and sys-
tem of  landholding. The original point was that of  communitarianism and fair 
access, the reality today is that ownership of  land has been skewed to favour a 
few elite groups (as compared to the very many smallholders and the landless).
These events have had a profound effect on Kenya’s political and social 
Constitution in a single but important way; they have served to entrench socioec-
onomic inequities in the political economy of  the country. The power structures 
in place have not managed to disentangle themselves from status quo considera-
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tions and have in this way not responded effectively to these injustices. Land-
holding and land access structure is important for organisation and economics in 
a society. Also, such structures reflect how power is held.46 Furthermore, where 
political tensions are organised around the structures of  inequalities in land own-
ership, they result in violent conflicts that destabilise the basic foundation of  that 
society. 
In Rawls’ hypothetical, the basic institutions of  society represent these 
power structures, which according to him must be subjected to regulation and 
criticism in accordance with the principles of  justice chosen by the society. As 
argued before, the primary legal sources in Kenya affirm the uncompromising 
nature of  basic liberties and justice. No particular form of  justice has been allud-
ed to, but Article 60 of  the Constitution and Sections 73 and 75 of  the National 
Land Policy are categorical on the primacy of  equity in the landholding sector.
Justice is the first virtue of  social institutions. What does justice in the land 
sector constitute? The best way to perceive what such justice would be is by first 
understanding what the injustice has been. The themes discussed in the previous 
passages are meant to provide a clear picture of  what historical injustices in land 
have constituted.
The promulgation of  the Constitution and the enactment of  the new land 
laws must mean that the people of  Kenya agree that the state must do something 
about the multiple layers of  land dispossession. This situation is congruent with 
Rawls’ theory in at least two respects. First, there has been a rational decision, 
based on consensus that has established principles of  justice that should regulate 
all further criticism of  government. Second, there is a primary role assigned to 
the power structures that constitute the institutions at the pinnacle (of  the basic 
structure) of  society.
Having established the injustice, the necessity to correct it and the positive 
declaration of  intention to correct it, if  these ideas are not to be shelved and 
forgotten, it is imperative that we identify how best to effectuate this intention.
Some attempts have been made, as mentioned before, to remedy the land 
question. However, these have seemed to focus on immediate causes of  land-
related conflicts, such as politically-charged ethnic claims to land. It is notewor-
thy that the root cause of  the land problem is iniquitous landholding structures 
that have remained embedded in the country’s political economy. If  these remain 
46 Mamdani M, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of  late colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press, 1996.
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unaddressed, there is no guarantee that the conflicts which Kenya’s history is rife 
with will not recur. 
This paper identifies the legal process of  Transitional Justice as the best 
avenue in pursuance of  the goals articulated by the Constitution as well as the 
Rawlsian ideal.
VII. The Promise of Transitional Justice
The previous sections have attempted to outline the issues which stand out 
the most in contemporary Kenyan society regarding land use and administration 
as well as the socioeconomic impact of  decisions made at a political level. The 
discussion has also attempted to bring to the fore the relevance of  core institu-
tions (stakeholders) strategically placed to settle the land question in the political 
structures of  government and legal institutions such as dispute-resolution agen-
cies. 
It has been argued that the contemporary land issues discussed have been 
occasioned by, in a nutshell: (i) iniquitous landholding structures embedded in the 
country’s political economy (this contribution has submitted that this is the root 
cause of  the land questions, the other being immediate causes or symptoms and 
incidents); (ii) inappropriate policies and priorities in resolving the root causes of  
land issues; (iii) dishonest and unscrupulous administration characterised by pil-
lage and the usage of  land as a political resource; (iv) myths and misconceptions 
regarding the role of  informal settlements and other land-related phenomena in 
the country’s socio-economic platform.
Armed conflict, authoritarianism and the humanitarian disasters and mas-
sive human rights abuses that often accompany them can have an immensely 
negative and long-lasting impact on development. As a result, transitional justice 
is often pursued in a context of  severely underdeveloped economic and social 
institutions, widespread scarcity of  resources and myriad competing needs.47 In 
the particular context of  this paper, the abuses upon which transitional justice 
imperatives are brought to bear relate to land rights enumerated in, primarily, 
Article 60 of  the Constitution as well as the principles underpinning the National 
Land Policy.
47 Office of  the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-
Conflict States: Prosecution Initiatives (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2006).
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The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour48 has 
argued for integrating economic, social and cultural rights into the transitional 
justice framework, thereby allowing justice, in its full sense, to make the 
contribution that it should to societies in transition. As argued extensively in 
this contribution, land is a critical economic, social and cultural resource, with 
far-reaching influences in these spheres of  life. Such is the case for Kenya. It 
is therefore imperative that transitional justice be integrated into the processes 
that aim to streamline issues in these sectors, to ensure economic development 
(for all) and, more importantly, social cohesion. 
Transitional justice can have a positive impact on development through 
direct effect and by helping create the conditions that facilitate development in 
the following ways:49 (i) such measures as individual and collective reparations, 
property restitution, rehabilitation and reintegrating victims and perpetrators 
may alleviate marginalisation, exclusion and vulnerability by bringing people and 
groups into the economy, recognising and empowering them as citizens and per-
haps generating economic activity, and (ii) important conditions such as political 
and social stability, safety, access to justice, conflict prevention and social and 
economic justice that can foster development may be facilitated by transitional 
justice objectives, including addressing grievances, reconciling groups and restor-
ing trust in institutions.
There are potential costs for transitional societies if  transitional justice in-
stitutions continue to neglect the economic roots and consequences of  conflict, 
in the absence of  socioeconomic redistribution. ‘The divorce of  development 
strategies from transitional justice allows a myth to be formed that the origins of  
conflict are political or ethnic rather than economic or resource-based.’50 This is a 
philosophy which could correctly guide reform institutions in Kenya, such as the 
National Land Commission, Commission for the Implementation of  the Consti-
tution, and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. An impunity gap results 
when transitional justice measures ignore accountability for large-scale corruption 
and economic crimes, and addressing poverty and social inequality must be re-
garded as among the strategic goals of  any transitional justice undertaking.51 This 
48 Arbour L, ‘Economic and social justice for societies in transition’ http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/40.1-Arbour.pdf  on 31st August 2015.
49 Alexander J, A Scoping study of  transitional justice and poverty reduction final report, Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID), 2003.
50 Miller Z|, ‘Effects of  invisibility: In search of  the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice’, 2 International 
Journal of  Transitional Justice, 3 (2008), 267–268.
51 Carranza R, ‘Plunder and pain: Should transitional justice engage with corruption and economic 
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perspective has important implications in light of  the gross economic injustices 
that the many preceding passages discussed here have sought to bring to light.
To those who qualify transitional justice as a necessary process in certain 
contexts, one objection regards the diversion of  resources which may conceivably 
be used to further other important ends. In response to this, it is important to note 
that it was this confounding of  priorities that the independence Government of  
Kenya fell prey to. Economic stability should not be put ahead of  social stability, 
since this may leave the underlying causes of  conflict, which are structural 
inequalities, unaltered. This does not solve the problem but slowly exacerbates 
it, and eventually the whole system implodes. It is a lesson that Kenya has learnt 
the hard way.
Perhaps a more intelligible and plausible objection or qualification to 
transitional justice is one pointed out by Tonya Putnam,52 that transitional 
justice presupposes the existence of  an entire set of  functioning institutions 
to investigate, prosecute and punish individuals who commit human rights 
violations. In societies emerging from civil war, such institutions are normally 
weak or non-existent, if  indeed they existed beforehand. An empirical study 
shows that the economic health of  a country may in fact affect the decision to 
pursue transitional justice.53
In response to this, this contribution submits that Kenya is not exact-
ly emerging from civil war, and that the issue at hand is systematic prejudice 
against lower-income and less-privileged sections of  the population. Moreover, 
such institutions as are referred to are in their abundance – there is the Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Land Commission, a relatively 
well-functioning judiciary and a very active and vocal civil society among other 
pressure groups. However, it is conceded here that political goodwill poses the 
most challenging hurdle (politicians may, and do, have vested interests in such 
regrettable realities as a dishonest landholding system) as evidenced by the appar-
ent reluctance or lethargy of  the political structures in the pursuance of  justice 
against alleged perpetrators of  the post- election violence, a process which was 
eventually taken up by the International Criminal Court.
Crimes?’, 2 International Journal of  Transitional Justice, 3 (2008), 329.
52 Putnam T, ‘Human rights and sustainable peace, in ending civil wars: The implementation of  peace agreements’, 
Stephen John Stedman (ed), Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002).
53 Olsen T, Payne L, and Reiter A, ‘At what cost? A political economy approach to transitional justice’ 
(paper prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, 14 April 
2007).
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At a broad level of  generality, transitional justice and land relate to each 
other through the concept of  the rule of  law.54 For many countries, poor govern-
ance has resulted in conflict or authoritarian rule, and the recovery from these 
states of  crisis depends on a radical shift in governance norms. Too much atten-
tion has historically been placed on the elaboration of  laws, and too little to the 
ways in which those laws are interpreted and implemented.55
A UN report56 has submitted that the increasing awareness of  the 
importance of  land issues in the rule-of-law field is to be welcomed, to the extent 
that rule-of-law programming goes beyond law reform57 and seeks to develop 
and operationalise an innovative approach to protecting land rights. This report 
defines ‘transitional justice’ as 
“the full range of  processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of  large-scale human rights abuses in order to ensure ac-
countability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.” As will be seen later, this defini-
tion has very comprehensive and important implications.
Due to the limited mandate (civil and human rights abuse) this concept has 
been applied to, it has often proven difficult to satisfactorily address these kinds 
of  abuses for political and practical reasons. Thus the argument that transitional 
justice processes should seek to address gross violations of  social, economic and 
cultural rights in addition to civil and political ones.58 Proponents argue that such 
crimes can be more widespread and severe than civil and political rights viola-
tions, involving more perpetrators and affecting more victims.
Because of  its emphasis on successful transition, other values are also 
important such as democracy, stability, equity and fairness to victims and their 
families. The task is not simply to seek redress for abuses, but to democratise the 
54 Mayer-Rieckh A and de Greiff  P (eds), ‘Justice as prevention: Vetting public employees in transi-
tional societies’
55 Take for instance the actual implications of  Section 73 of  the National Land Policy and Article 60 
(1) of  The Constitution of  Kenya (2010). The fact that these provisions are somewhat symbolic of  the 
national consciousness of  Kenyan society to land injustices goes without saying. However, the real 
question is whether these imperatives generate clear policy goals by which officials can be held ac-
countable. Also, there are questions of  the justiciability of  these imperatives as well as the particular 
responsibilities of  the correlative duty bearers.
56 FIAN International, Land Grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique: A report on two research missions and 
a human rights analysis of  land grabbing, 2010.
57 It is noteworthy that land law reform in Kenya has made significant strides, and various principles 
to regulate entitlements/interests, use and administration are well-articulated. Whether the same has 
had meaningful consequences on the ground is debatable.
58 See, for instance, the Millennium Challenge Account.
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decision-making processes at all levels and in all sectors of  societies.59 Important 
parallels may be drawn between this latter observation and the consensual deci-
sion of  the entrants of  the social contract in Rawls’ hypothetical, who decide 
freely and rationally on the future principles of  justice to guide their affairs.
The limited strategic planning and impact-evaluation of  rule of  law inter-
ventions has typically meant that the instruments of  the state undergo some im-
provements- but the structures and dynamics of  decision-making remain largely 
intact. A failure to address the political economy of  decision-making will mean 
that power structures remain intact and changes are only superficial.
Furthermore, the constant gains in protecting human rights and combat-
ing impunity may be undone through an increasing emphasis on ‘reconciliation’ 
without accountability. This gives the impression that access to justice prevails 
in what remains a structurally unjust situation. It will be reiterated here that it is 
fundamental that these processes remain threefold to attain legitimacy; they must 
be legal, rectificatory and distributive.
With this in mind, one may be tempted to ask, ‘How is Kenya a transitional 
society, and particularly why in the lands sector?’ To complement the accounts 
that have been narrated regarding historical injustices, conflicts and poor gov-
ernance that have characterised Kenya’s economic, political and even cultural 
spheres (deliberate destruction of  customary law forms and methods), the fol-
lowing paragraph should offer some specificity and direction.
The Ndung’u Report of  the Commission for Irregular and Illegal Alloca-
tions of  Public Land identified these problems as having characterised public 
land tenure. They include direct allocation by the President and/or Commis-
sioner of  Lands, contrary to law; illegal surrender of  ministry and state corpora-
tion land and subsequent illegal allocations; invasion of  government and trust 
lands and subsequent acquisition of  titles to it contrary to law; allocation of  land 
reserved for state corporations and ministries; allocation of  trust lands contrary 
to the Constitution and related laws; allocation of  riparian reserves and sites and 
allocation of  land compulsorily acquired for the public interest to individuals and 
companies.
In the same vein, the National Land Policy goes further in enunciating the 
crisis that has become the land question. It states that the genesis of  the problem 
was the colonial settler economy, which constituted disenfranchising of  natives 
59 Huggins C, ‘Linking broad constellations of  ideas: Transitional justice, land tenure reform, and 
development.’
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and systematic degradation of  customary land tenure. It notes that hitherto ex-
isting policies and law in Kenya pursue economic productivity at the expense of  
other equally important values such as equity, sustainability and the preservation 
of  culture. Furthermore, this ‘economic productivity’ is primarily a benefit of  a 
few and has been achieved at the cost of  severe incidents of  inequality and gross 
abuses of  economic and human rights.
The National Land Policy identifies some contemporary manifestations of  
the problem which include general disregard for land-use planning regulations; 
gross disparities in land ownership and inadequate environmental management 
and conflict over land and land-based resources. Above all this, Kenya has had 
to undergo the more appalling phenomenon of  consistent bouts of  violent con-
flicts over land and land-based resources, most recently the 2008 violence which 
almost reached genocidal proportions.
On account of  the above factors, Kenya has entered into a period of  transi-
tion with the promulgation of  the Constitution and the enactment of  new land 
laws whose rationale is to redress previous injustices including iniquitous land 
ownership structures. As stated earlier, limited strategic planning and impact-
evaluation of  rule-of-law interventions will typically mean that even though the 
instruments of  state undergo some improvements, the dynamics of  decision-
making and the iniquitous political economy will remain intact. It is advised that 
Kenyan society be wary of  falling into this trap. Thus the significance of  tran-
sitional justice processes in Kenyan society. As observed earlier, a key defining 
characteristic of  transitional justice is the overt engagement with the processes 
of  transition as well as adherence to domestic as well as international standards.
A significant setback that Kenya’s land structure has suffered has been the 
neglect of  customary and communal tenure. It has now become common knowl-
edge in academic as well as policy circles60 that a market-led model of  tenure 
reform is unsustainable as the dominant paradigm. It has also been demonstrated 
that in the African context there is no necessary causal link between individuali-
sation of  tenure and economic progress.61 Moreover, customary tenure systems 
have proven to be remarkably resilient, even in the face of  government hostility 
and the forces of  globalisation.62 This may be because they enjoy more local le-
gitimacy than systems imposed by government. It is of  note that the comparison 
60 National Land Policy, Sessional Paper No. 3 of  2009.
61 Nyamu C, ‘Breathing life into dead theories about property rights’, Institute of  Development Stud-
ies.
62 See Ogendo O, ‘The tragic African commons’, on the resilience of  customary land tenure.
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between customary tenure and ‘underdeveloped economic systems yet to evolve’ 
is unhelpful, given the vast cultural and political differences between the West 
and the developing world. 
In light of  the novel recognition of  customary land tenure, it remains to be 
seen whether deliberate attempts at restitution toward the relevant communities 
and groups (remember the case of  Westlands Market)63 will be effected, in a spirit 
of  accountability and operationalising the rule of  law.
It is such mechanisms of  transition, reconciliation and accountability that 
will conclude this discussion.
A pivotal enabling condition for transitional justice is judicial reform. The 
process may even be impossible without these structures. This contribution will 
not dwell on this point seeing that the judicial structure in the country is relatively 
capable. As noted earlier, however, the real prerequisite for the process to move 
forward is the political goodwill of  all stakeholders, citizens to demand retribu-
tive justice and restitution, for civil society and politicians to actively push for the 
agenda and the court to administer justice without fear (of  political elites that 
benefited from injustices), or favour.
In deciding whether to pursue the course of  transitional justice, a choice 
has to be made by the state between retaining the status quo, fully or partially 
returning to a previous status quo, or choosing a new status quo altogether.64 The 
decision of  the state (which would be expected to conform to the rational will 
and perception of  justice of  the people) would determine who is considered the 
legitimate property-rights holder at law.
Retaining the status quo would essentially mean affirming the legitimacy 
of  the market-led model of  development that presently subsists. This would 
in effect mean that title to land would be vindicated regardless of  how it was 
acquired. This move is likely to guarantee economic stability. However, its im-
portant flaw is that it engenders social resentment in the collective perception 
of  those affected by past abuses. Moreover, this paper argues that protection of  
illegally acquired title goes against the spirit of  the Constitution which has been 
viewed as a guarantee for change as well as its letter, particularly Article 40 which 
does not extend legal protection to illegally acquired property.
63 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 3.
64 Atuahene B, ‘Property and transitional justice, 58 UCLA Law Review, 65 (2010) Available at: http://
scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/34 on 30 July 2015.
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The return to a prior status quo would involve the state using the present 
distribution as a starting point and using its powers of  eminent domain to make 
land available for return to past owners.65 If  the beneficiaries of  unjust property 
rights transfer are readily available, they may be compelled to fully or partially 
finance restitution programs. If  they are not identifiable, the state should finance 
these programs.
Creating a new status quo if  implemented properly has the potential to equal-
ize wealth and promote stability.66 Redistribution would in this case be through 
tax or equalization of  land ownership. It has been argued67 that the former meth-
od is more efficient. 
The redistributive measures that may be applied here may be reparations or 
restorations.68 In the former program victims do not have a choice of  what com-
pensation they will receive; the state instead makes the decision after determining 
their eligibility. In the latter, the subject is allowed to participate in the determina-
tion of  compensation in order to ensure their re-entry into the social contract.
In returning to a previous status quo the hurdles to be surmounted will 
include69 identification of  beneficiaries, obtaining verifiable proof  of  ownership 
or occupation, acknowledging the people who owned nothing in the past, the 
proper usage of  the power of  eminent domain, transcending inefficiency and 
corruption on the part of  government and determining how far back the repara-
tion measures should look.
VIII. Some Remarks on Rawlsian Justice
The first principle of  justice as fairness is that every individual should en-
joy the full range of  rights that are compatible with the basic liberties of  others. 
It has been demonstrated that land ownership structure has been deliberately 
skewed to favour a very small segment of  the population at the expense of  the 
majority who are smallholders or inhabitants of  informal settlements.
65 Atuahene B, ‘Property and transitional justice.’
66 Atuahene B, ‘Property and transitional justice.’
67 Kaplow L and Shavell S, ‘Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in redistributing 
income.’
68 Kaplow L and Shavell S, ‘Why the Legal System Is Less Effi cient Than the Income Tax in Redistrib-
uting Income.’
69 Atuahene B, ‘Property and transitional justice.’
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The second principle of  justice as fairness would require that any inequali-
ties in a society should be designed in such a manner that they are to the greatest 
benefit of  the least advantaged. Inequalities in land rights in Kenyan society have 
been shown to be debilitating and even dehumanizing, for instance in the case of  
forced evictions and slums.
Rawls provides that these principles are to be arranged and pursued in a 
lexical order.70 ‘A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are 
fully met or do not apply.’ With the historical injustices discussed with regard to 
land, it is hard to conceive of  the second principle as directly applicable; the first, 
despite being affirmed by legal sources, has not been fully met. To this extent, 
but arguably,71 the second principle is not particularly relevant as a framework for 
structuring Kenya’s political and social Constitution.
IX. Conclusion
Presently, the substantive realities of  the land question in Kenya betray the 
uncompromising principles that are justice and the guarantee of  basic liberties 
imposed by the Constitution and enacted land laws. Procedurally, bold steps need 
to be taken to bring these realities into unity with the notions of  justice as fair-
ness. 
In particular, other than reforming the instruments of  state that have led 
to these abuses, care should be had to the power structures that in nuanced 
ways have influenced the conduct of  these instruments. Here lies the importance 
of  transitional justice mechanisms. When well-implemented, they are blind and 
possibly immune to such external or political influences. This is contrasted to 
such measures as settlement schemes and attendant land titling which have 
proved to be myopic and responsive to immediate rather than deep-rooted 
causes of  iniquitous land distribution.
Such measures should include the enactment of  an informal settlements 
policy and the active pursuance of  the transitional measures of  land redistribu-
70 Rawls J, A Theory of  justice, 61.
71 Arguable because of  the contention that it is impracticable to revert to a position of  equality when 
property irregularly acquired is transferred to a bona fide third party. See Robert Nozick’s three 
principles that cover the subject of  justice in holdings in Anarchy, State and Utopia. In response to 
this, however, this paper argues that Nozick concedes, in his entitlement theory, that rectification of  
injustice in holdings is a principle of  justice.
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tion that include restorations and reparations. The merits and demerits of  the 
different approaches to the issue of  the status quo have been outlined.
This contribution does not presume that the logical-or factual- end of  the 
processes of  transitional justice in the Kenyan situation would be to yield a state 
of  affairs perfectly congruent to the Rawlsian hypothetical. The fine points un-
derlying this observation have been discussed. Nevertheless, the arm of  justice 
will swing and strike.
